我们将税收归宿在完全竞争下的五大原则扩展到了不完全竞争下的一般模型。这些原则包括：
1） 物质和经济归宿的独立性
2）定性方式
3）定量方式
其中税收分为消费者和生产者两方
4）税收转嫁的决定因素
5）本地归宿的整合以确定盈余的总划分。
我们将展示如何运用这些原则来简化和归纳对包括新市场的最佳采购以及三级价格歧视的福利效益在内的一系列经济问题的分析。
Abstract
We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of imperfect competition. The principles cover 1) the independence of physical and economic incidence, the 2) qualitative and 3) quantitative manner in which taxes are split between consumers and producers, 4) the determinants of tax pass-through and 5) the integration of local incidence to determine the overall division of surplus. We show how these principles can be used to simplify and generalize the analysis of a range of economic questions such as the optimal procurement of new markets and the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination.
We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of imperfect competition. The principles cover 1) the independence of physical and economic incidence, the 2) qualitative and 3) quantitative manner in which taxes are split between consumers and producers, 4) the determinants of tax pass-through and 5) the integration of local incidence to determine the overall division of surplus. We show how these principles can be used to simplify and generalize the analysis of a range of economic questions such as the optimal procurement of new markets and the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination.