This is a lay summary for the article <ARE PROTESTS GAMES OF STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSTITUTES? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM HONG KONG'S DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT> that was first published on <Journal of Political Economy> on February 13th, 2017. Authors of this research include Professor Y. Jane Zhang from Division of Social Science Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
What drives Hong Kong students’ decisions to participate in the high-stakes Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement?
At the core of social science research on protests lies a crucial strategic element: an individual’s participation is shaped by beliefs about the participation of others. Much recent work assumes that the protest game is one of strategic complements: beliefs that others are more likely to turnout increase one’s own likelihood of turnout. Yet, incentives to free-ride on others’ political collective action or to send a signal of one’s “type” or “identity” could generate a game of strategic substitutes.
While much theoretical work has been done on the strategic element of the protest decision, empirical evidence on the causal effect of beliefs regarding others’ protest turnout on one’s own is extremely limited. This paper conduct the first experiment studying individuals’ strategic motives to participate in a high-stakes political protest, manipulating the beliefs of potential protest participants.
METHODS AND SAMPLES
The goal of the experimental design of this research is to isolate the causal effect of variation in beliefs regarding others’ protest participation on one’s own protest participation. To do so, we provide a random subset of individuals in our sample truthful information intended to shift beliefs regarding others’ protest participation. A challenge we face is that such information must be provided prior to the protest itself — before we know the actual protest decisions of others.
To solve this problem, we issues three part studies as follows:
－One week before the protest, on June 24, 2016, researchers collected information on individuals’ own planned participation in the upcoming July 1 anti-authoritarian protest, individuals’ beliefs about others’ planned turnout, as well as individual ’ beliefs about other’s future actual turnout at the protest. In this part study, researchers recruited participants sending an email to the entire undergraduate population of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST). Researchers received 1,744 completed surveys, Among these, they focus on the 1,576 students who were either born in Hong Kong or moved there prior to high school (Hong Kong “natives”). they paid students for their participation, On average, respondents received HKD 205, approximately US$ 25, for completing this first survey.
－On June 30, 2016, researchers provided a random subset of their experimental sample with information regarding the true level of planned protest participation (information obtained from the first survey). For both the information treatment group and the control group, researchers again elicited beliefs regarding other subjects’ actual protest participation on July 1, 2016. Comparing posteriors between the treatment and control groups provides an estimate of the “first stage” relationship. Experimental intervention was also conducted in Part 2 of the study, a very short online survey sent in an email on June 30, 2016, and completed by 1,303 Hong Kong native students. students received a payment of HKD 25 for completing the survey.
－On July 15, 2016, Researchers elicited subjects’ participation in the July 1 protest. This provides them with their outcome variable of interest and comparing participation rates between the treatment and control groups provides an estimate of the “reduced form” relationship of interest. Self-reported July 1 protest participation is also the outcome in their two stage estimates of the effects of beliefs regarding others’ protest participation on one’s own. Researchers elicited students’ participation by sending a third online survey via email on July 15, 2016, and completed by 1,241 Hong Kong native students.19 Students who completed Part 3 of the study received an additional payment of HKD 25.
The effect of the information treatment — informing the treatment group that 17% of experi- mental subjects planned to attend the protest — can be seen in the distributions of beliefs regarding subjects’ actual participation, presented in Figure 2. One can see in the figure that prior beliefs regarding actual participation for the majority in the experimental sample were below 15%; the median is at 10%, and the distribution exhibits a long tail. One also sees in the figure that the distributions of posterior beliefs regarding actual participation look very different comparing the treatment and control groups. The control group’s distribution of posteriors looks very much like the experimental sample’s distribution of priors, but shifted slightly to the right. In contrast, the treatment group’s posteriors are distributed much more tightly between 10% and 20%.
Researchers find a broad range of evidence indicating that Hong Kong students considering participating in the July 1 protest of 2016 viewed the strategic element of their decision as a game of strategic substitutes. Experimental exposure to information regarding other subjects’ planned participation affects Hong Kong university students’ beliefs regarding other students’ actual future participation in an antiauthoritarian protest, and affects students’ own protest participation. Specifically, individuals in the treatment group with prior beliefs below the truthful information provided to them updated their beliefs positively and became less likely to participate in the protest; individuals with prior beliefs above the truthful information provided to them updated their beliefs negatively, and became more likely to participate. The negative association between beliefs regarding others’ participation and one’s own is also seen in the naturally occurring variation in beliefs present among control subjects in this study.
Davide Cantoni, David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman, Y. Jane Zhang. (2017, February 13). Are Protests Games of Strategic Complements or Substitutes? Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Democracy Movement. National Bureau of Economic Research, 10.3386/w23110.